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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
abandoned in April of 1976, the proposed plant had been cut back to 3,000
megawatts while the estimated cost had increased to $3.5 billion.2 7
Gloria Bates
Municipal Corporations: A Recommended Procedure
for "Accelerating" or "Revoking" Continued
Sentences
In the eyes of many, municipal courts are considered the forgotten step-
child of Oklahoma's judiciary. But any motorist who has been cited for a city
traffic violation knows full well the existence of municipal courts, especially
if he has waited in line to pay a fine. In fact, municipal criminal courts of
record, present only in cities of more than 200,000 population,' have
caseloads comparable in volume to any district court's crowded docket.
2
Considering their workloads, municipal criminal courts of record should not
go unnoticed nor unappreciated.
To help alleviate the burden that could be imposed on city jails if all
sentences for which jail time is permissible did result in imprisonment,,
municipal criminal courts of record judges are authorized to defer, suspend,
or continue imposition of sentences.' This sentencing power is actually
broader than that given state district judges because district judges can defers
227 Id.
' 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-101 (Supp. 1980).
2 In Oklahoma City, for example, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, the city's
two courts of record had 166,006 cases filed and 152,269 disposed of. When these statistics are
combined with figures from the city's court not of record, 315,727 cases were filed for the year
and 245,723 disposed of. A two-page leaflet distributed by the Oklahoma City Municipal Court
states, "The overall activity of the Municipal Court has increased significantly over the past five
years. Over 100,000 citizens pay fines and appear in court annually, more than any other court
in the State of Oklahoma."
'1 OKLA. STAT. § 14-111(B) (Supp. 1980) and 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-102(C) (Supp. 1980)
authorize a maximum punishment of 90 days' imprisonment and a $300 fine for city ordinance
violations.
4 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-123(B) (Supp. 1980) authorizes a court of record to defer or sus-
pend imposition of judgment and sentence and to place defendants on probation not exceeding
six months. Upon successful completion of probation, the defendant is discharged without a
judgment of guilt and his record is expunged. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-123(C) (Supp. 1980)
authorizes a judge to continue or delay imposing judgment and sentence for no more than six
months. At the end of the term, the judge may allow the city attorney to amend the charge to a
lesser offense.
1 22 OKLA. STAT. § 911C (Supp. 1980) authorizes a district judge to defer a sentence so
that upon successful completion of the sentence, the defendant has no record of guilt.
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or suspend6 sentences but cannot continue them. This power to continue
sentences is unique to municipal criminal courts of record because not only
do Oklahoma district courts lack the authority to continue sentences, but ap-
parently no other state has authorized its state courts to sentence defendants
to sentences similar to the continued sentence.' Because continued sentences
are unique to Oklahoma municipal criminal courts of record, this note will
explore whether continued sentences can be "revoked" or "accelerated" for
probation violations, and if so, what procedure should be followed for
"revocation" or "acceleration." Procedures have been enunciated by statute
for revoking suspended sentences" and by case law for accelerating deferred
sentences9 in district courts, but no procedure has been outlined for "revok-
ing" or "accelerating" a continued sentence.
In Oklahoma City, for example, the continued sentence typically is used
in cases of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, a crime punishable by a fine not to exceed $300 and/or imprisonment
not to exceed 90 days.'" In those cases, the defendant pleads guilty to the
charge and is given a six-month continued sentence under the supervision of
the city's probation staff. Upon successful completion of probation, the
defendant returns to court at an appointed time, and the judge allows the city
prosecutor to amend the charge to the lesser offense of reckless driving, a
crime also punishable by a fine not to exceed $300 and/or imprisonment not
to exceed 90 days." The defendant then pleads guilty to this lesser charge and
is fined $150. A problem arises, however, when the defendant fails to com-
plete probation successfully and the prosecution seeks to "revoke" or "ac-
celerate" probation. The questions then are raised whether the court can
"revoke" or "accelerate" probation, and, if so, when should notice be given
by the prosecution and what requirements of due process must be met prior
to "revocation" or "acceleration.'
2
22 Oxn.A. SrAT, § 991a (Supp. 1980) authorizes a district judge to impose a sentence
but to suspend execution of that sentence so that the defendant can serve his sentence on proba-
tion rather than in prison. A defendant's record, however, is not expunged upon successful com-
pletion of probation.
I Most jurisdictions allow state judges to suspend or defer sentences or place defendants
on conditional or unconditional discharge, but apparently no state court has a sentence similar
to the continued sentence used in the municipal court.
22 OKLA. S'AT. § 991b (Supp. 1980).
See, e.g., lelier v. State, 597 P.2d 338 (Okla. Cr. 1979); Moore v. State, 577 P.2d 916
(Okla. Cr. 1978).
10 Oklahoma City, Okla., Code § 34-78 (1970) makes driving an automobile while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor unlawful, while Oklahoma City, Okla., Code § 34-83(a)
(1970) prescribes the punishment for such violation.
"1 Oklahoma City, Okla., Code § 34-77 (1970) makes reckless driving unlawful, while
Oklahoma City, Okla., Code § 34-83(a) (1970) prescribes the punishment for such violation.
11 See text beginning at note 8, supra.
19811
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss1/43
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
Revocation: Is It Possible?
Municipal courts are subject to creation, alteration, or abolition by the
legislature, and their jurisdiction is limited "to criminal and traffic pro-
ceedings arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities
and towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized by such ordinances.""
Municipal courts are generally courts of limited jurisdiction, and "basically,
ordinances provide all authority which said courts possess."'" Thus, before a
court can revoke a continued sentence, the court must be authorized to do so
by statute or ordinance unless the power to revoke can be found within the
court's inherent powers.
Municipal courts are authorized by statute to revoke deferred and
suspended sentences for probation violations," but, as noted, revocation of
continued sentences is not mentioned in the statute." In Oklahoma City, for
example, the City Code provides that the court may revoke a suspended
sentence' 7 or a deferred sentence,'" but the ordinance does not mention the
use of continued sentences nor their revocation.' 9 As a result, it can be
argued that by their omission of any reference to such power the legislature
and the Oklahoma City City Council did not intend the courts to have the
power to revoke continued sentences. If the legislature and Oklahoma City
did intend the courts to be able to revoke continued sentences, then why did
they not expressly provide for the power as they did for deferred and
suspended sentences? But what good is a continued sentence if a defendant
could be placed on probation and then violate probation without fear of
revocation? Certainly, the court must have the power to revoke probation if
it has the power to place someone on probation. The two powers would ap-
pear to go hand in hand. But, unless revocation has been expressly author-
ized, the power apparently does not exist.
One might argue, however, that the court impliedly has the power to
revoke a continued sentence because the statute authorizing continued
sentences does not require that the court must allow the prosecutor to reduce
the charge to a lesser offense at the end of the probation term; rather, the
statute states the judge "may allow the city attorney to amend the charge to a
lesser offense." ' 0 Reduction is not mandatory; therefore, by refusing to
'1 OKLA. CONST.. art. 7, § 1.
" Jeffries v. Tulsa, 536 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Okla. Cr. 1975).
11 "Upon a finding of the court that the conditions of probation have been violated, the
municipal judge may efiter a judgment of guilt." 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-123(B) (Supp. 1980).
16 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-123(C) (Supp. 1980).
17 "Any suspension shall be subject to revocation for violation of its terms." Oklahoma
City, Okla., GCde § 2-39 (1970).
11 "Upon violation of the conditions of probation, the Municipal Judge may enter a
judgment of guilt." Id.
19 Id.
20 11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-123(C) (Supp. 1980).
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allow the charge to be reduced, the court is in effect revoking probation.
Thus, the power to revoke can be implied from the statute.
Although it arguably appears that the court has the implicit power to
revoke probation, the issue of whether the court has the inherent power to do
so still should be addressed. In Jeffries v. Tulsa,2 a municipal judge attemp-
ted to defer a defendant's sentence for one year even though the statute then
governing sentencing in the municipal courts only authorized suspended
sentences. The judge argued he could defer the sentence as part of his in-
herent powers and as implied from the powers of district judges to defer
sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, held the court did not
have the inherent power to defer the sentence.
We next consider the view as expressed by the trial court that such
deferral or passing the time for imposition of sentence is within the in-
herent power of the court. We cannot agree. Had the legislature deemed
such power to be inherent, we feel by comparison that the District
Court would not be governed by such a sentencing statute as 22 O.S.
1971, § 991a, 991b or 991c. 22
Thus, it appears a municipal judge does not have the inherent power to
revoke a continued sentence because by analogy district judges are given the
express power by statute to revoke and accelerate deferred and suspended
sentences, respectively. Revocation and acceleration are not inherent in their
powers. "
Although the question is a close one, it appears a municipal judge may
revoke probation under a continued sentence as implied by statute. If this
power cannot be inferred, the court's effectiveness would be curtailed. What
good is a court that cannot penalize a defendant for violating one of its
orders? As a matter of sound policy, then, municipal courts should be found
to have the revocation power in order to uphold their integrity and credibil-
ity. Finally, as a precautionary measure, a city could pass an ordinance ex-
pressly authorizing judges to revoke a continued sentence in their discretion.
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted "in passing" in Jeffries v. Tulsa that
Tulsa could pass an ordinance authorizing deferred sentences even though
the statute then in force authorized judges to suspend sentences but did not
mention deferred sentences.23 Thus, the argument noted earlier that omis-
sions in statutes and ordinances control ascertainment of lawmakers' inten-
tions could be sidestepped simply by a municipality passing an ordinance
allowing judges to revoke continued sentences. Then, the intentions would be
clear and no question would arise as to whether a court could revoke a con-
tinued sentence.
21 536 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Okla. Cr. 1975).
22 Id. at 1316.
2' Id. at 1317.
1981]
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Assuming the power to revoke, however, does not exist, and no or-
dinance is passed authorizing revocation, a continued sentence could be viewed
as similar to a presentence investigation and report. Just as a judge
sometimes waits for a presentence report before imposing sentence, a
municipal judge could use the continued sentence as a time for reflection
before imposing a lesser sentence at the end of the probation term.24
However, the decision would be determined by whether the defendant suc-
cessfully completed probation. If the judge decided not to allow reduction of
the charge as previously agreed to in the plea-bargaining session between
counsel, the judge, of course, would have to allow the defendant the oppor-
tunity to reaffirm or withdraw his guilty plea. " King v. State,"6 a case
recognizing the role of plea bargaining in Oklahoma's judicial system, re-
quires the court to inform the defendant at the time he enters a guilty plea
that if the court does not concur in the recommended sentence after receipt
of the presentence report and other relevant evidence, the defendant will be
granted the opportunity to reaffirm or withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, it
would appear this procedure would have to be followed in municipal court if
the power to revoke a continued sentence does not exist.
Losing Jurisdiction
Assuming the judge has the implied power to revoke probation under a
continued sentence, it would appear certain notice requirements must be met
before revocation can occur; otherwise, the appellate court will lose jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.27 In Jeffries v. Tulsa, the appellate court dismissed
the case because the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the defendant.
We further note that due to the expiration of time exceeding the max-
imum period which may have been assessed as a penalty for violation of
the ordinance, ninety days, and that period which the judge of the
municipal criminal court of record could have placed the defendant on
probation, we conclude the municipal criminal court of record has lost
jurisdiction over the defendant.
2 8
The same reasoning has been used in district courts to require that a written
application for acceleration must be filed before the end of the term or
jurisdiction over the defendant is lost. In State v. Rodriguez,29 the
defendant's sentence had been deferred with the term of probation to end at
9 A.M. October 17. The defendant appeared at the courthouse at 8:45 A.M. on
the appointed day, and at 9:15 A.M. the district attorney prepared and filed
24 Judges often request a presentence report on a defendant before imposing sentence so
they will have a better understanding of the defendant's background.
2 King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 535-36 (Okla. Cr. 1976).
26 Id.
27 See text beginning at note 29, infra.
21 Jeffries v. Tulsa, 536 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Okla. Cr. 1975).
29 547 P.2d 974 (Okla. Cr. 1976).
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an application to accelerate. The district court, however, refused to consider
the application because the term had expired. The Court of Criminal Appeals
upheld the judge's action:
Unless application by the State is filed during the period of probation
that probationer has violated the conditions of his deferred sentence,
prior to the completion of the term of probation, the trial court is
without authority to accelerate the deferred sentence .... Accordingly,
we find that the term of a deferred sentence ends at the hour the
defendant is told to reappear?0
As long as the application is filed before the term ends, the court does not
lose jurisdiction over the defendant even if the actual hearing to accelerate is
not held until after the term's expiration. "[I]t should be noted that the ac-
tual hearing can be held on the application to accelerate the deferred sentence
after the term of the deferred sentence has run, provided, that the application
itself is filed prior to the end of the term."'" The same principles also apply
to revoking suspended sentences for probation violations. In Reese v. Page3"
it was held that, "The court could only lose jurisdiction to revoke the Order
suspending said sentence when the time originally imposed had expired." In
another case a defendant, serving a suspended sentence, was arrested upon
an oral application to revoke, but written application was not filed until 32
days after the term had expired. It was held the sentence could not be revoked.
"[S]entence can be revoked only within the period of time imposed in the
sentence and a revocation of a suspended sentence after that period is inef-
fective, and after that period the court is without power to enforce the
original judgment." 33
Thus, written notice timely filed is necessary before revocation of de-
ferred sentences or acceleration of suspended sentences can occur in the district
court. Although no procedure has been outlined for revoking a continued
sentence in municipal criminal courts of record, by analogy, written notice
timely filed should be held necessary. Analogy is appropriate because while
municipal courts are required to follow the code of criminal procedure used
in the trials of misdemeanors in the district courts3 4 district court sentencing
procedures are not applicable to municipal criminal courts of record because
"the word 'trial' has been generally construed to mean the period commenc-
ing with the empanelling of the jury and terminating with the reception of the
10 Id. at 975.
3 Id.
32 410 P.2d 883, 886 (Okla. Cr. 1966).
11 Exparte Miller, 88 Okla. Crim. 441, 443, 203 P.2d 890, 891 (1949).
"4 "All trials had in the municipal criminal court of record, except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the criminal code of pro-
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verdict or plea of guilty."" In addition, although district courts are author-
ized to defer and suspend sentences but not to continue them, the statutes
authorizing district courts to defer and suspend sentences can serve as
guidelines. In Jbffries v. Tulsa,36 the Court of Criminal Appeals said that
deferred sentencing procedures used in the district court were not applicable
to municipal courts but the procedures could serve as a basis for construing
deferred sentencing procedures in the municipal courts. "[S]ome guidance
may be gained by referral to such statutes and an examination of the cases
construing said statutes. '37 Thus, a minimum requirement of written notice
filed before the end of the probation term would appear to be necessary
before a municipal criminal court of record judge could revoke a continued
sentence.
Due Process Requirements
In developing a procedure for revoking continued sentences, the
reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals should be followed, and the pro-
cedures for revoking suspended sentences and accelerating deferred sentences
should be examined for possible guidelines. While the procedures differ for
revocation and acceleration,3" they both require that the defendant be af-
forded procedural due process as guaranteed by both the Oklahoma and
United States constitutions.39 Thus, the same due process considerations
should apply to revocation of continued sentences. Certainly the legislature
did not intend to deprive defendants serving continued sentences of due pro-
cess when it drafted legislation providing for continued sentences.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has construed Section 991c of Title 22
of the Oklahoma Statutes (Supp. 1980) to require basically four criteria to be
met before a deferred sentence can be accelerated. "Due process requires a
hearing after due notice, the right to confront accusers and the right to
counsel. Included in the above, of course, would be a right to present sworn
testimony and documentary evidence at a hearing on the merits."' 0 In
another case the court said the four requirements of due process are a hear-
ing after due notice, the right to confront accusers, the right to counsel, and
the right to present sworn testimony and documentary evidence at a hearing
on the merits. 4 ' The state also has the burden of proving probation violations
by a "preponderance of the evidence."'
2
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,3 the United States Supreme Court set out
Jeffries v. Tulsa, 536 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Okla. Cr. 1975).
36 Id. at 1317.
37 Id.
39 Acceleration of a deferred sentence requires one hearing, while revocation of a
suspended sentence requires two hearings. Moore v. State, 577 P.2d 916, 918 (Okla. Cr. 1978).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7.
" Moore v. State, 577 P.2d 916, 918 (Okla. Cr. 1978).
"' Beller v. State, 597 P.2d 338, 339 (Okla. Cr. 1979).
41 Cleveland v. State, 566 P.2d 144, 146 (Okla. Cr. 1977).
.' 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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minimum guidelines for revoking a suspended sentence. The defendant had
been given a suspended sentence and placed on seven years' probation when he
was arrested and charged with burglary. Scarpelli's probation then was
revoked without a hearing. On appeal by a writ of habeas corpus, the Court
held the defendant was entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hear-
ing, because probation revocation results "in a loss of liberty," which is a
"serious deprivation" requiring that the probationer be afforded due pro-
cess. 4' The Court held that standards previously enunciated for parole
revocation would be applicable to probation revocation because no substan-
tive difference exists between the two-both involve cases where sentences
already have been announced." At the preliminary hearing, held after the de-
fendant's arrest and detention, a summary hearing is conducted to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant has committed a
violation of his probation. 4 6 The probationer, at this hearing, has certain
rights-the right to notice of the alleged probation violations, an opportunity
to appear and present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to con-
front adverse witnesses, the right to an independent decision maker, and a
written report of the hearing."'
At the final hearing, which is a "less summary one because the decision
under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere
determination of probable cause," the defendant must be afforded the
"minimum requirements of due process." 48 Those requirements include writ-
ten notice of the alleged probation violations, disclosure to the probationer
of the evidence against him, the opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence, the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached hearing body, and a writ-
ten statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking probation. 49 The Court, however, did not find that a constitutional
right to counsel exists for indigents.5 '
The Oklahoma statute outlining the procedure for revoking a sus-
pended sentence requires that a petition setting forth the grounds for revoca-
tion must be filed by the district attorney with the court clerk and that com-
petent evidence justifying the revocation of the sentence must be presented to
the court at a hearing within 20 days after the defendant's arrest."' The
statute also states the defendant has the right to counsel, to present evidence,
44 Id. at 781-82.
41 rd. at 784-86.
" rd. at 782.
41 Id. at 786.
4Id.
9 rd.
50 "The need for counsel at revocation hearing derives, not from the invariable attributes
of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases .... We thus find no
justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel."
Id. at 789-90.
11 22 OKLA. STAT. § 991b (Supp. 1980).
1981]
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and to confront witnesses against him at the hearing.5 2 In Woods v. State,"
the Court of Criminal Appeals held the statutory procedure "substantially"
complied with the minimum requirements promulgated by the Supreme
Court except for the necessity of a preliminary hearing. The court also noted
the statutory procedure provides probationers an additional safeguard-the
right to counsel." ' In order to comply with the judicially promulgated
minimum standards, the court held that a preliminary hearing should be con-
ducted in conjunction with the arraignment for determination of probable
cause.-' At the hearing, a violation must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence. 6
As can be seen readily, the procedures for revoking suspended
sentences and accelerating deferred sentences in Oklahoma differ only in the
number of hearings required. Revocation of a suspended sentence requires a
preliminary hearing and a final hearing, while no preliminary hearing is
necessary for accelerating deferred sentences. The reason for the difference
can be found in the nature of the sentences. In Moore v. State," the defend-
ant's deferred sentence was accelerated, so he claimed his due process rights
had been violated because he was not afforded two hearings. The Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, said the defendant was not entitled to a
preliminary hearing because of the difference between a suspended and a de-
ferred sentence."s With a suspended sentence, judgment and sentence have
been entered, but execution of the sentence is suspended. However, with a de-
ferred sentence, no judgment and sentence has been imposed. Finally, it should
be noted that while there is no constitutional right to counsel at a revocation
hearing, the United States Supreme Court has held there is a right to counsel
when the state attempts to accelerate a deferred sentence.5 9 In Mempa v.
Rhay,60 the Court held that a right to counsel does exist because sentencing is
a critical stage calling for counsel, and with a deferred sentence, sentencing
does not occur until the sentence is accelerated for violation. If a defendant
successfully completes probation under a deferred sentence, no judgment
results on his record and no sentence is imposed at the time a defendant is
placed on probation.
Conclusion
It appears certain that some procedures affording due process must be
followed before a continued sentence can be revoked. At a minimum, written
52 Id.
11 526 P.2d 944, 949 (Okla. Cr. 1974).
4 Id.
,1 Id. at 949-50.
5 Cleveland v. State, 566 P.2d 144, 146 (Okla. Cr. 1977).
57 577 P.2d 916, 917 (Okla. Cr. 1978).
11 Id. at 918.
,1 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
60 Id.
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notice timely filed is necessary or the court will lose jurisdiction over the
defendant. The prosecutor should not be allowed to walk into the courtroom
at the appointed hour for expiration of the probation term and suddenly an-
nounce he wishes to revoke probation. Up until that time, the defendant's
counsel has proceeded under the assumption that his client has completed
probation successfully and expects to have his charge reduced to a lesser of-
fense. The defendant certainly should not be deprived of due process, which
would appear to include the right to present evidence and confront his ac-
cusers. Both of these rights are given the defendant whose deferred or
suspended sentence is being accelerated or revoked.
A municipal criminal court of record basically has three options in
selecting a procedure for revoking continued sentences: follow the procedure
used in district court for accelerating deferred sentences, which does not in-
clude a preliminary hearing; follow the minimum requirements for revoking
a suspended sentence as promulgated by the Supreme Court; or follow the
procedure used in district court for revoking a suspended sentence, which in-
cludes the right to counsel and the right to a preliminary hearing. In making
the decision, it should be determined whether a continued sentence is more
similar to a deferred sentence or a suspended sentence. The continued
sentence appears to be more comparable to the suspended sentence because a
defendant successfully completing probation under a continued sentence or a
suspended sentence will have a record of a conviction, while a defendant suc-
cessfully completing probation under a deferred sentence will have no record.
Thus, the choice of procedures to follow in municipal court is narrowed to
the procedures that have been promulgated for revoking suspended
sentences.
As mentioned before, the only difference between the procedure used in
Oklahoma district court and the procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court is the right to counsel. The requirements set down by the Supreme
Court, however, are only minimum requirements. A state always can raise
those standards, as Oklahoma has done.6 ' Since the legislature has provided
by statute for the right to counsel in both suspended and deferred sentences,
it would seem only natural that the legislature would do the same if it set out
guidelines for revoking probation of continued, suspended, or deferred
sentences in the municipal criminal courts of record. Therefore, the
municipal court should follow the procedure used in district court for revok-
ing suspended sentences. That procedure would require written notice timely
filed, a preliminary hearing for determination of probable cause, and a final
hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the defendant would have the right to
present evidence and confront his accusers. At the final hearing, the defend-
ant would have the right to counsel, to confront his accusers, and to present
evidence. Finally, the judge would make a written statement as to the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking the continued sentence.
Dee Steer
" 22 OKLA. STAT. § 991a (Supp. 1980) and 22 OKLA. STAT. § 991c (Supp. 1980).
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